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IS THE PSI REALLY THE CORNERSTONE OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL NORM?

Mark J. Valencia

This essay was written in response to the article “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” by Joel Doolin, published in
the Naval War College Review (Spring 2006, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 29–57).
Doolin’s article contains some serious substantive flaws in interpretation,
logic, and conclusions. The general thrust and conclusion of the paper is that
through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) it has become or is becoming
customary international law to be able to interdict and board vessels on the high
seas without flag-state consent to search for and seize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials. This contention, however, is not supported
by the relevant facts and is deleterious to the regime of freedom of navigation,
1
which the U.S. Navy has held sacrosanct and zealously defended for centuries.
Doolin’s specific arguments marshaled to support the contention that interdiction of vessels on the high seas without flag-state consent has become or is
becoming customary international law include widespread support for the PSI,
state sovereignty in its territorial sea, an “overwhelming majority” of nations
having signed conventions “outlawing” the proliferation of WMD, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, and Article 51 of the UN Charter
(Right of Self-Defense). The following summarizes problems with these
arguments.
The paper repeats without analysis the U.S. government contention that “more
than sixty countries have signaled that they support the PSI and are ready to participate in interdiction efforts” (page 31). As Sharon Squassoni of the U.S. Congressional Research Service has pointed out, it is unclear what “support” for the PSI
means and how robust it is.2 The “concrete steps” for contribution to the PSI
3
listed on the U.S. State Department website are rather vague and conditional.
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First and foremost, participating states are encouraged formally to commit to
and publicly endorse, if possible [my italics], the Statement of Interdiction Principles. Follow-up steps are also replete with conditional language, such as “indicate willingness,” “as appropriate,” “might contribute,” and “be willing to
consider.”
It is true that sixty-six countries attended a closed-door meeting in Warsaw
4
on 23 June 2006, marking the third anniversary of the initiation of the PSI.
However, no list of participating countries has been made available, and the definition of “supporting” countries remains unclear. Indeed, it is nigh impossible
to obtain an “official” list of PSI-supporting countries. Apparently this is because
some—perhaps many—so-called supporting states have not publicly endorsed
the PSI principles. Reasons given include not wanting to provoke North Korea,
wanting to avoid possible reprisals for cooperating with the United States,
fearing that interdictions on the high seas will jeopardize international trade
and undermine international law, and not perceiving the PSI as a top security
5
priority. This reluctance to publicly endorse the PSI principles in itself indicates
less than stalwart support in general, let alone in time of specific need. Indeed,
given the flexibility of cooperation, many if not most of the so-called supporters
would not automatically participate in interdictions of vessels or aircraft at the
behest of the United States. Thus, in a pinch, support could easily evaporate. In
any case, such soft support does not warrant a conclusion that PSI activities will
change international practice regarding interdiction on the high seas without
flag-state consent.
Moreover, while there is indeed a growing list of nations willing to associate
themselves with different aspects of the PSI on a case-by-case basis, support in
Asia—a major focus of proliferation concern—is weak. Despite considerable
U.S. pressure to participate fully and publicly, key countries like China, India,
Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia remain outside the “coalition of the willing,”
and the cooperation of others that have nominally joined, such as Japan, South
Korea, and Russia, for various reasons is lukewarm at best.
A state may “approach, visit, and search any vessel in its territorial sea and contiguous zone” (page 35). Navigation in the territorial waters of any coastal state is
subject to the innocent-passage regime—that is, it is allowed as long as it is not
6
prejudicial to the coastal state’s peace, good order, or security. Specific noninnocent acts are listed in the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the
Sea (1982 UNCLOS) Article 19, and transporting WMD components or missiles
is not among them. Moreover, the 1982 UNCLOS Article 23 implicitly gives ships
carrying nuclear weapons the right of innocent passage. These articles were a
U.S.-led compromise with those nations that wanted the Convention to explicitly declare carriage of nuclear weapons in foreign territorial seas to be
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non-innocent. Thus for a coastal state to legally interdict a vessel in its territorial
sea without flag-state consent because the vessel is thought to be carrying WMD
or related materials, the coastal state would probably have to have in place legislation criminalizing WMD transport or demonstrate that the vessel is threatening its security due to the presence on board of WMD destined for persons
7
intending to undertake terrorist activities in areas under its jurisdiction. Perhaps in a stretch the coastal state could argue that because the recipient of the
WMD is unknown, it has to assume they are bound for an enemy. But a coastal
state cannot, as the author contends, simply “approach, visit, and search any vessel in its territorial sea.”
WMD are subject to seizure because “the overwhelming majority of nations have
signed treaties outlawing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons” (page 37). “The NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], CWC [Chemical Warfare Convention], and BWC [Biological Weapons Convention] are arguably enforceable against nonsignors. The implication for military operations would
seem to be that seizure of WMD items found aboard foreign ships or aircraft may be
authorized” (page 37). Doolin provides his own counterargument to this extreme statement. “No interpretation is permitted when the text of a treaty is
clear—and none of the WMD or terrorism conventions authorizes maritime interdiction. Each treaty was the product of negotiation by states, and subsequently changed security needs, however compelling, cannot add a right to
maritime interdiction that does not exist in its language” (page 38). Indeed!
UNSC Resolution 1540 strengthens the evolution of customary international
law toward accepting “the boarding of vessels on the high seas to search for
[WMD]” (page 51). Doolin hedges by implying that flag-state consent is still
needed. Indeed, this is made clear in the background to UNSC Resolution 1540.
In March 2004 the United States tried to obtain a UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing states to interdict, board, and inspect any vessel or
aircraft if there were reason to believe they were carrying WMD or the technology to make or deliver them, and to seize or impound missiles or related technology or equipment. This was a difficult—and, as it turned out, frustrating—
tacit admission by the United States that it needs a UN mandate to legitimize
high-seas PSI interdictions.
There were several initial objections to the draft. Foremost was the question
of what constitutes “weapons-related materials”—a definitional problem that
continues to undermine the legitimacy of the PSI. Another particular area of debate was the text’s proposal that parties “to the extent consistent with their national legal authorities and international law” cooperate on preventing, and if
necessary interdicting, shipments of WMD and related materials. In other
words, the United States sought UN support for PSI interdictions. The text did
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/10
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not include a British proposal for a UN counterproliferation committee or a
French proposal for a permanent corps of UN weapons inspectors. In other
words, according to the U.S. proposal, enforcement would be outside the UN
system.
After considerable debate in and outside the Security Council, a revised draft
resolution emerged that asked all UN members to “criminalize” the proliferation of WMD, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials
8
within their own borders. The final resolution that emerged after further debate
was introduced to the Security Council on 24 March 2004 and passed on 28
April 2004 (UNSCR 1540). It requires all 191 UN members to “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws to prevent any nonstate actor from being able to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport or use nuclear, chemical or bi9
ological weapons and their means of delivery.” Specifically, it compels all countries to adopt laws to criminalize the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to
ensure that they have strong export controls, and to secure sensitive materials
10
within their borders.
Significantly, Russia and China prevented a specific endorsement of interdic11
tion and the PSI in the resolution. Indeed, the text was agreed upon only after
the United States accepted China’s demand under a threat of a veto to drop a
provision specifically authorizing the interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting WMD, a cornerstone of the PSI. China also objected to any suggestion
that the Council would endorse ad hoc frameworks like the PSI.
With these amendments, China, France, and Russia supported the revised
draft. However, a vote was delayed because Council members wanted every UN
12
member state to be briefed on the resolution. Ironically, Pakistan, a prominent
U.S. ally in the war on terror, led opposition to the resolution until it was assured
it would not be retroactive and a provision allowing intrusive inspections was
13
deleted. Opponents of the resolution were also concerned by the Security
Council’s assumption of the authority essentially to make national law and by
possible sanctions against UN members that do not comply. They also objected
to the secret and arrogant manner in which the text was negotiated among only
the Permanent Five before its introduction. In the end, the resolution did little to
strengthen the effectiveness of the PSI, since it focused only on nonstate actors
and did not clearly authorize interdiction or any action outside current international law.
Without a clearly worded UNSC resolution specifically authorizing high-seas
interdiction, any such interdiction over the objection of the flag state would be
tantamount to aggression and could be considered an act of war. Even if a country were to enforce the PSI principles only in its own territorial waters, each
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14

interdiction may require Security Council approval, or only be legal in very
specific circumstances.
Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, supports the goals
15
of the PSI. But he would prefer that such issues and actions be addressed and
16
undertaken collectively through and by the United Nations. He has said that
17
the Security Council must be “the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force.”
Other core PSI members such as France favor this approach and have proposed a
Security Council summit meeting to frame a UN action plan against proliferation and to create a corps of inspectors to carry it out.
Article 51 of the UN Charter could be used “as a trump card” [to interdict without flag-state consent vessels on the high seas carrying WMD] (page 46). Preemptive self-defense includes anticipatory self-defense and preventive
18
self-defense. For an action to be compatible with current international legal interpretations of anticipatory self-defense, the United States and its coalition
partners would probably have to demonstrate not only that the interdicted cargo
required such action because it posed a specific and imminent threat of attack
on the United States or its allies, but also that the necessity of self-defense was instant and overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no time for delibera19
tion. That is, a response was necessary, proportional to the threat, and the
20
threat was imminent. Otherwise such action and argument would be greatly
expanding the traditional definition of self-defense to include preemptive
self-defense regarding non-imminent threats and would set a very dangerous
precedent that could undermine the very foundations of the United Nations. In
fact, Article 51 provides the right of self-defense only in the case of an armed attack, and only until the UN “Security Council has taken measures necessary to
21
maintain international peace and security.”
Doolin himself acknowledges that “universal condemnation of [WMD] and
terrorism cannot be used as justification for violation of another state’s sovereignty” (page 48). Indeed, as he says, the only time national defense could be
used to justify maritime interdiction on the high seas without flag-state consent
would be “if the facts established that the transport of [WMD] toward the
coastal nation constituted an imminent threat of an armed attack” (page 48).
In sum, the underpinnings of Doolin’s argument are not substantiated. International law does not permit high-seas interdictions and boardings without flagstate consent except in very specific circumstances that do not include transport
of “WMD, related materials and delivery systems.” It is highly questionable
whether such interdictions are allowed even for a vessel in innocent passage in
the territorial sea. Neither the PSI, existing nonproliferation treaties and weapons conventions, UNSC Resolution 1540, nor Article 51 support interdiction on
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/10

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:13:22 AM

6

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

128

Valencia: Research & Debate—Is the PSI Really the Cornerstone of a New Inte

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

the high seas in violation of the freedom-of-navigation regime. Such interdiction without flag-state consent is not, and is not likely in the foreseeable future
to become, customary international law.
As for amending Article 110 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea as suggested by Doolin (pages 50, 51), the United States as a non-party has
no official role in the matter. Indeed, one of the most egregious inconsistencies
of this piece is that it frequently cites the 1982 UNCLOS to support its arguments. The United States is not a party to this grand bargain and cannot “pick
and choose” which provisions it will follow.
The sad fact is that the PSI and ancillary measures have done little or nothing
to restrict the movement of WMD and closely related materials on flagged ships
and planes of North Korea, Iran, or other “countries of proliferation concern,”
22
especially those owned and operated by their governments. Another sad fact is
that the implementation, if not the conception, of the PSI was and is seriously
flawed. Yet the PSI’s proponents and its defenders continue to ignore many of its
problems and to exaggerate its progress and effectiveness.
All this is not to say that trade in WMD and related items should be ignored,
although it may not be possible to prevent it altogether. To help nonconsensual
high-seas interdictions for WMD transport to become customary international
law, wider and more robust state support is required. To engender this support,
the PSI’s shortcomings must be acknowledged and addressed. Most of the PSI’s
shortcomings stem from its ad hoc, extra–United Nations, U.S.-driven nature.
Bringing it into the UN system would rectify many of these shortcomings by
loosening U.S. control, enhancing the initiative’s legitimacy, and engendering
near-universal support. Whether or not the PSI is formally brought into the UN
system, its reach and effectiveness could be improved by eliminating hypocrisy
and double standards (e.g., when it comes to India, Pakistan, and Israel), and increasing transparency. Needed is a neutral organization to assess intelligence,
coordinate and fund activities, and to make decisions regarding specific or generic interdictions. Such an organization could provide more objective and legitimate definitions of states “of proliferation concern” and “good cause” (for
interdiction). It would also help avoid erroneous judgments, resolve disagreements, provide consistency and a concrete structure and budget, and ensure
compliance with international law—or be a vehicle for any agreed changes
therein.
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